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Robin West

A Response to Goodwin Liu
Professor Liu’s article1 convincingly shows that the Fourteenth
Amendment can be read, and has been read in the past, to confer a positive
right on all citizens to a high-quality public education and to place a correlative
duty on the legislative branches of both state and federal government to
provide for that education. Specifically, the United States Congress has an
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, Liu argues,
to ensure that the public education provided by states meets minimal standards
so that citizens possess the competencies requisite to meaningful participation
in civic life. Liu’s argument is not simply that Congress may, within the grant
of power of the Fourteenth Amendment, address educational inequality, if it
sees fit to do so (thus withstanding federalism challenges). Rather, Liu’s claim
is that the states, and Congress, jointly must do so. The Constitution imposes a
duty on government to educate, and confers a positive right to an education
upon the citizenry. A decent education, Liu argues, is part of what it means to
be a citizen under the United States Constitution.
I applaud the constitutional and the moral ambition of this piece. Liu’s
paper is a stellar example of what I hope will prove to be an emerging genre: an
exploration of the possible meaning of constitutional phrases in our
constitutional text and history, as viewed through the lens of legislative
purposes and legislative ends. The article is a study of constitutional politics
rather than constitutional law; it is a study of the effect of constitutionalism on
legislative decision-making rather than the effect of constitutionalism on
adjudicated constitutional law. I hope that this article proves fecund—that it
inspires not only criticism but also like-minded efforts to improve other aspects
of our public life through a capacious view of our representative branch’s
constitutional obligations.
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Liu’s argument has two somewhat undeveloped implications that I believe
are worth exploring, one jurisprudential and one practical. Let me begin with
the jurisprudential. As Liu acknowledges, his reading of the Constitution’s
Citizenship Clause goes against the grain of now-conventional Fourteenth
Amendment wisdom. First, he reads that Clause to convey positive rights, and
finds support for that interpretation in the similar readings of the Clause by
authoritative others. Second, he reads the Fourteenth Amendment as directed
to Congress as well as to courts, and as imposing duties upon Congress to act.
If Liu is right, then neither the Court’s nor most commentators’
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment fully capture the meaning of the
constitutional text and history. Liu therefore puts forward his historical
analysis as a corrective to contemporary mis-readings. We are wrong, he
suggests, to assume so confidently that the Constitution is one of negative
rights only, that the Citizenship Clause confers no positive rights on citizens,
and that the legal community that produced the Reconstruction Amendments
had no sense of the connections between education and citizenship. To the
contrary: at least some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers understood
the centrality of education to citizenship, and some viewed the Fourteenth
Amendment as imposing obligations upon Congress and the states to provide
education. And we are wrong, Liu claims, to regard the Reconstruction
Amendments as a directive to courts to strike errant legislation, rather than as a
prod to the legislator to enact law that promotes liberty, equality, and
citizenship. At least, Liu argues, we are wrong to think that our contemporary
understanding of the Constitution is the only possible understanding, or that it
is unequivocally the understanding that was shared by all of the Framers of the
Reconstruction Amendments.
Liu does not, however, address the underlying jurisprudence of his
historical reconstruction—an omission that may have consequences for the
plausibility of his reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. He does not, for
example, consider that the Reconstruction Era actors may have had a different
jurisprudential understanding of the meaning of constitutional law and of the
role of the judiciary in enforcing it. As Larry Kramer,2 Mark Tushnet,3 and a
number of other historians have argued, it is quite possible that lawyers of the
Reconstruction era had a different “constitutional jurisprudence” from that
which governs modern judicial understandings of constitutional guarantees. If
Kramer and Tushnet are right about that, then interpretations that made sense
to the Reconstruction generation may make much less sense to us today. It
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may be that if we are to reinvigorate the Reconstruction vision of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship, and of the role of education
in achieving that guarantee, we will need to reinvigorate some forgotten
jurisprudential ideas as well.
Let me sketch out the contrast I have in mind, and its implications for
contemporary constitutional thought, very briefly. Perhaps it was possible
during Reconstruction (and perhaps at the Founding as well) to speak of the
Constitution as a document that guided the hand of Congress as well as
restrained it, that spoke to congressional obligations to act as well as
congressional obligations to refrain from acting, and that expressed a “law” for
legislation addressed to the legislator. The Constitution, it could still at least be
said then, had a political, as opposed to a purely legal existence: it was
addressed to the political branches no less than the judicial. It was possible,
given such an understanding of what Tushnet now calls the Constitution’s
“political law,”4 to understand the Fourteenth Amendment as a political
directive to the political branches to do certain things with their power, rather
than a legal directive to the judicial branch to restrain legislative power through
enforcing negative rights. It might have been possible to understand the
Constitution as setting forth a moral direction for politics, rather than as a law
meant to relentlessly restrain and check legislative power.
It is much harder for us, today, to see the Constitution as such a document.
Rather, for reasons I have discussed at length elsewhere,5 we tend instead to
see the constitution as ordinary law, and hence constitutional questions—such
as whether Congress is constitutionally obligated to ensure that the States
provide a minimally adequate education to all citizens—as questions of
“ordinary law.” Constitutional law tells us what the relevant actors –
legislators, executives, and so forth – may and may not do, just as commercial
law tells us what sellers, buyers, and holders of secured loans or commercial
paper may and may not do. We view the Constitution, on this jurisprudential
scheme, as a source of ordinary law, rather than as a source of political wisdom,
inspiration, or guidance. Further, and importantly, all of us now being legal
realists, we view these questions of ordinary law—including constitutional
law—as questions for courts to decide. Constitutional questions, then,
including those of the sort Liu raises, become by definition questions of law for
courts to decide.
How does all of this affect the fragile case for a purported right to a
minimally adequate education? If constitutional rights and duties are those
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rights and duties which are a part of law, and law is that which is discovered,
expressed, and enforced by courts, then it is not at all surprising that
constitutional rights have been limited to those that are negative, and
correlatively, that legislative duties grounded in constitutionalism have
virtually disappeared. As a practical matter, courts cannot enforce positive
rights; as a jurisprudential matter, they are disinclined to do so. Courts exist to
do legal justice between parties, not to provide social goods, whether or not
those goods are constitutionally required. Given our contemporary
jurisprudential identification of law with judicial utterance, it will accordingly
be exceedingly difficult for modern constitutionalists to read the constitutional
text to include a positive right to an education and an affirmative duty of
legislators to provide one.
But note what generates this conclusion: it is our jurisprudence, not our
constitutional text, history, or law. We have come to view constitutional law as
adjudicated law. But this is a limited view. If we understand the Constitution
to mean (only) the law enforced and interpreted by courts, then we limit our
understanding of justice to those types of justice that are discoverable and
enforceable by courts. Distributive and social justice will not survive such an
understanding. For a host of familiar reasons, courts will not find positive
rights to welfare, education, health, and so on in the Constitution. Because we
now so identify our sense of justice with the mandates of the Constitution, our
constitutional jurisprudence, in a very tangible way, limits our moral ambitions
for a just polity.
It is therefore not surprising that Professor Liu begins his piece with a
process-oriented argument to the effect that the Constitution can and should
be read as a document directed toward Congress, not the courts, and as a set of
duties for legislators. He is right to do so: if we begin with the premise that the
Constitution contains a positive right to an education, then we must indeed at
least suspend belief in—if not jettison—our constitutional jurisprudence. But
here, we have a problem. A full and alternative jurisprudence has yet to be fully
articulated by those who wish to read the Constitution both faithfully and
capaciously so as to include positive rights, such as a right to education. We do
not have a modern jurisprudence that can embrace the concept of a
Constitution that is read as a political document, for and by the political
branch, yet nevertheless is also in some sense law. Such a jurisprudence may
well be a necessary pre-condition for a Constitution that can plausibly be read
as containing positive rights of citizens and corresponding duties of legislators,
including the right to an education.
My jurisprudential point, then, is simply that if we are going to take
seriously the possibility of a “legislated Constitution”—a Constitution directed
to, and therefore interpreted and enforced by legislatures—we will have to first
develop a robust jurisprudence that can support it. That jurisprudence in turn

160

response to goodwin liu

will have to rediscover a concept of law that has been lost to us for at least a
half-century: an idea of law as a moral prod to better politics rather than an
idea of law as merely a tool with which courts may de-legitimize the results of
politics.
My second point is entirely practical. A Constitution directed at
legislatures, and intended for legislative interpretation and implementation,
requires legislators equipped, willing, and desirous to so receive it. We don’t
currently have anything even remotely resembling such a legislative assembly
at either the federal or state level; for a very long time we have not delegated
the work of constitutional interpretation to Congress, and it shows. There are a
handful of constitutionally savvy senators—Joseph Biden, Orrin Hatch, Barack
Obama—but there is no institutional sense in Congress that senators or
representatives should be interested and engaged readers, interpreters, and
implementers of the constitutional text. Nor do our representatives seek out
qualified staff to help them develop constitutionally guided law. While we
expect constitutional wisdom, reason, moral astuteness, and moral ambition
from judges, we expect horse trading at best from Congress. Courts reason
toward justice, with an eye on liberty and equality and citizenship for all, while
Congress acts and on the basis of preference, whim, good reasons, bad reasons,
or no reasons. For the sort of deliberative, morally ennobling politics we
habitually identify with a highly ethical form of practical reason, we go to the
courts.
For Liu’s normative proposal to get off the ground, we must reverse those
expectations. In that task— unlike so much in our current political milieu—we
in the law schools might actually have some power to effect change. Law
schools routinely send off wonderful graduates to judicial clerkships. Why
shouldn’t we likewise aspire to send some of our outstanding graduates to
senatorial and congressional clerkships? If senators and representatives ought
to be reading, interpreting, and implementing the Constitution, perhaps they
could hire young lawyers just out of law school to aid the effort. It might prove
to be a felicitous association.
A lawmaker, no less than a judge, could benefit from the educated advice
that a law graduate could bring to the task. If my vision were ever to come to
pass, the conscientious legislator would look to the Constitution not to answer
the question, “What is the law?” but rather the question, “What should the law
be?” The legislator, like the judge, must be mindful of the past when
answering that question; nevertheless, this question is different from the one
the judge asks. Law graduates could bring idealism, enthusiasm, intelligence,
and tremendous learning to the legislator’s task of constitutional
interpretation.
And what would be in it for the graduates – most of whom, after all, will
not ever be legislators? First, it’s worth noting that the vast majority of law
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graduates now clerking or aspiring to clerk for judges will never be judges.
Surely, a one-year internship in a congressional office, with the responsibility
for ensuring that the legislative product is based, in part, on a generous and
faithful interpretation of the Constitution, would provide as much and possibly
more practical knowledge than a one- or two-year clerkship with a judge.
Lawyers should know the ins and outs of the legislative process no less than of
the appellate process. It’s not unreasonable to suppose that lawyers who have
had experience at either the state or federal level assembling a bill, drafting a
bill, and discussing its constitutionality would be as welcome an addition to
any number of firms and practices as lawyers with one year of experience
writing memoranda for appellate court judges.
Finally, our law might benefit. Look just to the “right to an education” that
Professor Liu champions. Constitutional lawyers have achieved victories in
courts for the occasional learning disabled student, the racially segregated
school district, and the economically distressed high school. But legislative
victories on these issues, and for these citizens, if informed by the legislated
Constitution, might hold out greater promise still. And no matter what
happens in the courtroom, senators and representatives themselves could be
inspired by the moral aspirations of their law clerks to reach for a generous,
capacious, and progressive understanding of constitutionalism, such as that
depicted in Goodwin Liu’s remarkable article, to guide their labors.
Robin West is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
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